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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. The decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the 
decision of the Third Judicial District has the effect of 
establishing a rule of law that a Summary Judgment is appropriate 
when discovery is still pending. 
2. The decision of the Court of Apeals has the effect of 
establishing a rule of law that a court need not take the view 
most favorable to the party resisting a Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
The decisions of the Court of Appeals as established above 
are contrary to established case law as set forth elsewhere in 
this petition. 
REFERENCE TO OFFICIAL REPORT OF DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS 
This petition is based upon the decision of the Court of 
Appeals of the State of Utah, bearing the caption of this peition 
Court of Appeals # 860109-CA dated July 28, 1987. A copy of the 
opinion from which this petition is taken is attached n the 
appendix. 
STATEMENT OF GROUNDS FOR JURISDICTION 
A. The Judicial decision of the Court of Appeals of the 
State of Utah was rendered July 28, 1987. 
B. Pursuant to Rule 45 (e) Petitioner obtained an extension 
of time within which to file this Writ. 
C. This Writ is filed within that extension period. 
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PROVISIONS OF LAW 
The provision of law governing the issues herein arises out 
of Rule 56 (Summary Judgment) the pertinent portion thereof is 
as follows: Rule 56 (b) & (c) U.R. of C.P. state as follow: 
(b) FOR DEFENDING PARTY. A party against whom a claim, 
counterclaim,, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment 
is sought,, may, at any time, move with or without supporting 
affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any 
part thereof. 
(c) MOTION AND PROCEEDINGS THEREON. The motion shall be 
served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. 
The adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing 
affidavits. The judgment wrought shall be rendered forthwith if 
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A 
summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on 
the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as 
to the amount of damages. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The case before the Court involves written and oral lease 
agreements. The case is complex with many issues involved. The 
issues before this Court and or appeal before the Court of Appeals 
deal with procedural issues. 
1. After depositions had been taken of the Plaintiff's 
President, David Yurthr and of the Principal Defendant, S.M. 
Horman, the Defendant's counse filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
2. Defendant had noticed up its motion for summary judgment 
to be heard at 8:30 a.m. on November 16, 1984. (R.387) 
3. Present counsel was retained only 24 hours prior to the 
hearing (R.388) 
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4. Counsel filed a petition for extraordinary review and 
request for additional time to respond to and argue in opposition 
to motion for Summary Judgment. (R.387) That motion was denied. 
However, the court gave leave to file a memorandum within 20 days. 
(R. 386) 
5. Defendant in support of summary judgment cited 
affidavits of-six persons. Further, the deposition of Sidney 
Horman was extensively cited. 
6. Many of the persons named were complete strangers to 
Plaintiff and Plaintiff desired and gave notice of taking their 
depositions. 
7. Upon receipt of notice of deposition of Sidney Horman 
and others, Defendant's counsel responded saying: 
With respect to the depositions you have noticed, it is my 
understanding of the Judge's ruling that any further discovery 
necessarily awaits his ruling on the motion for summary judgment. 
Should that motion be granted, there would, of course, be no 
further discovery. If the motion shold be denied, I shall be 
pleased to cooperate with you in setting dates. (Your notices 
conflict with other depositions previously scheduled by me, and I 
would not be able to accomodate you in those dates in any event.) 
(R. 434) 
8. Plaintiff submitted an affidavit in support of its 
motion for extraordinary review. (R. 570) Said affidavit (R. 576) 
alleged the need to take the deposition of nine persons. Notices 
of deposition were served on Roger Evans, Bill Selvig, Mike 
Chitwood, William Oswald and Sid Horman. (R. 579, R. 581 through 
R. 587) 
Defendant would not make himself available for deposition as 
is shown above. 
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The affidavits submitted by Plaintiff raised issues of fact. 
The lower court denied motion to certiorari, denied motion to 
compel further discovery and granted summary judgment. 
Petitioner feels that said decision was contrary to case law 
established by this court. 
ARGUMENT FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT 
POINT 1. PLAINTIFF, THROUGH COUNSEL, WAS NOT GIVEN THE 
OPPORTUNITY TO CONDUCT DISCOVERY TO ADEQUATELY RESPOND TO 
DEFENDANT'S AFFIDAVITS OF FACT. It would not greatly have delayed 
the proceedings to have allowed the discovery. The court in Cox 
vs. Winters 678 p. 2d 311 (Utah, 1984) stated: 
Trial court abused its descretion in denying investors 
opportunity to conduct further discovery prior to granting 
attorney's motion for summary judgment. . 
It is axiomatic that a summary judgment ought not to be granted if 
all facts cannot be placed before the court. 
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Thus, Plaintiff was told that Plaintiff could not do 
discovery necessary to respond to the summary -judgment motion 
until after the decision was entered. The affidavits of 
Defendants were clearly created by Defendant to support its case. 
Plaintiff had no opportunity to conduct discovery related to the 
alleged facts. The case is complicated and has resulted in 
voluminous pleadings. (Defendant's counsel even apologizes for 
length of his brief. R.323). 
Plaintiff requested time and the opportunity to conduct 
further discovery. Such request was denied, and the conducting of 
additional discovery would not have prejudiced Defendant. The 
result was that all of the facts were not and are not on the 
table. 
In a similar fact situation, Auerbachs vs. Kimball, Supreme 
Court, State of Utah, November 15, 1977, 572 P. 2d 376, the Court 
said: 
The granting of the motion for summary judment was 
premature, because Kimball's discovery was not then complete. It 
was the information sought in the proceedings for discovery, which 
Kimball claimed would infuse the issues with facts sufficient to 
defeat a motion for summary judgment, and sustain his 
counter-claim. Whether such would be the case cannot now be 
determined, because such facts, if they exist were not allowed to 
be discovered. 
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When a motion is made opposing summary judgment, on the 
ground discovery has not been completed, the court should grant a 
continuance or deny the motion for summary judgment; unless the 
motion in opposition is deemed dilatory or without merit. If the 
motion for summary judgment is denied, the denial should be 
without prejudice to its renewal after an elapse of adequate time 
for completion of discovery. 
The affidavits and depositions cited have controverted the facts 
alleged by Defendant and raise reasonable issues of fact. 
POINT IV. SUMMARY JUDGMENT MAY ONLY BE GRANTED WHERE THERE 
IS NO ISSUE OF FACT: 
The court is not called upon to weigh evidence or make 
findings of fact. Burningham vs. Ott 525 P. 2d 620 (Utah, 1974). 
The court is not permitted to nor required to make findings of 
fact but can only find that there are no issues of fact. Carr vs. 
Bradshaw Chevrolet Co. 464 P. 2d 580 23 Ut. 2d 415 (Utah 1970) and 
the court cannot consider weight or credibility of witnesses 
Singleton vs. Alexander 431 P. 2d 126, 19 Ut. 2d 292. 
Further, to sustain a motion for summary judgment, the 
pleadings, evidence, admissions and inferences should be most 
favorably reviewed from point of view of the party opposing 
summary judgment, and must show that there is no issue of material 
fact Frederick May & Co. vs. Dunn 368 P. 2d 266, 13 Ut. 2d 40 
(Utah, tl962) See also Bowen vs. Riverton City 656 P. 2d 434. 
CONCLUSIONS 
1. Plaintiff was not given an opportunity to conduct 
discovery necessary to properly place all facts before the court. 
2. The facts upon which Defendant relies have been 
controverted. 
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3. The court is required to determine only that there are 
no issues of fact. This is clearly not the case. 
4. Reviews of materials submitted in affidavits and 
depositions must be interpreted in the light most favorable to the 
Plaintiff. 
Based upon the foregoing, the decision and opinion of the 
Court of Appeals is contrary to established case law of this 
court. 
Petitioner respectfully requests that this court hear the 
issues here presented. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
Lorin N. Pace 
Pace & Parsons 
Attorney for Petitioner 
350 South 400 East, Suite 101 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 364-1300 
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I hand delivered a copy of the 
ir^. foregoing Petition for Writ of Certiorari this I y day of October, 
1987 to: 
L.R. Gardiner, Chapman & Cutler, 50 South Main, SLC, Ut. 84110 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
Downtown Athletic Club, 
a Utah Corporation/ 
Plaintiff and Appellant/ 
v. 
S. M. Horman/ an individual 
a/k/a Sid Horman; S. M. 
Horman & Sons# a partnership; 
and S. M. Horman & Sons Company, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
S. M. Horman & Sons Company/ 
Counter-Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
Downtown Athletic Club/ a Utah 
corporation/ and David G. Yurth, 
an individual/ 
Counter-Defendants and 
Appellant. 
Before Judges Billings, Garff/ and Jackson. 
Billings, Judge: 
Appellant/ Downtown Athletic Club (""DAC,,) appeals from the 
district court's judgment denying its motion to continue and 
its motion to compel further discovery, and granting 
respondents' (jointly referred to as HHormanH) motion for 
summary judgment. DAC contends that the trial court erred in 
ruling as a matter of law that the conditions precedent to the 
parties' agreement were not satisfied thus discharging Herman's 
obligation to perform. We affirm. 
DAC executed a written agreement with S. M. Horman on May 
8/ 1981 entitled "Construction & Lease Agreement for the 
Downtown Athletic Club" ("Construction & Lease Agreement"). 
This agreement provided that Horman would construct athletic 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 860109-CA 
F I L E D 
JUL 2 3 1987 
Timothy M. Shea 
Clerk of the Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
clubs and then sublease the clubs to DAC. The Construction & 
Lease Agreement delineated several conditions precedent to" 
Horman's obligation to perform: 
1. Horman would construct improvements to the Harver 
Warehouse Building provided that the Harver Warehouse 
Building could be reinforced at a price that was 
acceptable to both Horman and DAC, and in a manner 
that would satisfy the building code requirements of 
the Salt Lake City Building Department. 
2. Horman was to commence construction only after 
confirmed receipt and acceptance by Horman of 
construction financing acceptable to Horman, and the 
entire lease was specifically subject to Horman being 
able to secure sufficient financing at a rate not to 
exceed 12% per annum and that DAC should pay all 
annual interest charges in excess of 12% per annum 
provided Horman did decide to pay a higher interest 
rate than 12%. 
3. DAC had use of office space in the old Kress 
Building only if it paid the nominal rent of $1.00 per 
month. 
4. Horman was obligated to construct the athletic 
clubs only if DAC sold a sufficient number of 
memberships prior to beginning construction of the 
athletic clubs in order to guarantee that the payments 
required by the Construction & Lease Agreement would 
be paid. 
5. DAC was to assign dues income of individual 
membership contracts, by contract number, to a special 
account designated solely for the payment of monthly 
lease payments to verify that there were sufficient 
funds available. 
DAC contends that the parties orally modified the 
Construction & Lease Agreement by including an assignment of 
part of Horman1s leasehold interest in the Harver Warehouse 
Building to DAC. This oral agreement also contained conditions 
precedent most of which were identical to those enumerated in 
the Construction & Lease Agreement: 
1. The owners of the Harver Warehouse Building had to 
completely and absolutely release Horman from all 
obligations under the lease and accept DAC as the new 
lessee in place of Horman. 
2. Engineering studies had to be completed and 
approved by Salt Lake City for the renovation of the 
Harver Building. 
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3. Adequate financing for the completion of the 
construction of the athletic club(s) had to be secured. 
Horman served notice on DAC to "quit the premises" after it 
sold some of the subject property to the Salt Lake Acquisition 
Group* Consequently, DAC filed suit against Horman on seeking 
specific performance and damages for breach of the written and 
oral agreements* Horman filed its answer and counterclaim for 
declaratory judgment/ tortious waste, unlawful detainer, and 
slander of title on January 6, 1984. 
Comprehensive discovery ensued with each party producing 
hundreds of documents. Discovery ended with the depositions of 
the two principals. David Yurth, president of DAC, was deposed 
on April 2, 1984 resulting in a 283 page transcript, 36 
exhibits, and over 13 pages of corrections. S. M. Horman1s 
deposition was taken April 26, 1984 resulting in a 245 page 
transcript and several exhibits. No further discovery was 
conducted by either party. 
Horman filed its motion for summary judgment together with 
supporting affidavits and a memorandum of points and 
authorities on July 19, 1984, nearly two months after the last 
deposition was taken and when there were no outstanding 
discovery requests. Oral argument on the motion was scheduled 
for August 28, 1984. On August 22, 1984, six days before the 
motion was to be argued, DACfs counsel moved to withdraw and 
requested a 60-day extension to respond to Herman's motion. 
The district court granted both of these requests. 
Sixty days elapsed without an appearance from DAC and 
without response to the motion. Consequently, on October 26, 
1984, Horman served written notice on DAC pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-51-36 (1978) requesting that it either appoint 
counsel or appear in person. On November 2, 1984, Horman 
renoticed its motion for summary judgment and scheduled the 
hearing for November 16, 1984. On November 13, 1984, DAC's new 
counsel entered an appearance and filed a motion for 
continuance, an Hextraordinary request for review,H and noticed 
nine depositions all of which were scheduled after the 
scheduled oral argument on Horman's summary judgment motion. 
On November 16, 1984, the district court heard oral 
argument on DAC's motion to continue and Hormanfs motion for 
summary judgment. The district court denied DAC's motion to 
continue, took Horman*s motion for summary judgment under 
advisement, and gave DAC an additional twenty days to file a 
written response to Horman's motion for summary judgment. On 
December 6, 1984, DAC filed a motion to compel discovery 
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seeking to -continue- S. M. Horman's deposition.1 DACfs 
motion to compel was supported by an affidavit claiming the 
need for further discovery. After receiving several 
continuances, DAC filed its memorandum in opposition to 
Hormanfs motion for summary judgment on December 10, 1984 
together with eight affidavits, some of which were unsworn and 
unsigned. 
The district court denied DAC's motion to compel further 
deposing of S. M. Horman and granted Horman's motion for 
summary judgment holding that the oral agreement was void under 
the statute of frauds and that Horman was excused from 
performing under the Construction & Lease Agreement because 
none of the conditions precedent had been performed. This 
appeal followed. 
Three issues are raised on appeal. First, did the lower 
court abuse its discretion in denying DAC's motion to continue 
and its motion to compel further discovery? Second, is the 
oral modification of the Construction & Lease Agreement void 
under the statute of frauds and, if not, do the uncontested 
facts demonstrate that Horman was excused from performing under 
the terms of the modification? Third, did the lower court err 
in granting Herman1s motion for summary judgment ruling that 
Horman was excused from performing under the Construction & 
Lease Agreement as DAC failed to satisfy the requisite 
conditions precedent? 
We will review the facts and inferences in the light most 
favorable to DAC, the party against whom the judgment was 
granted. Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat'l Bank. 737 P.2d 225, 229 
(Utah 1987). 
I. 
The first issue we must address is whether the trial court 
erred in denying DAC the opportunity to conduct further 
discovery prior to the entry of summary judgment. Generally, 
summary judgment should not be granted if discovery is 
incomplete since information sought in discovery may create 
genuine issues of material fact sufficient to dcsfeat the 
motion. Auerbach's Inc. v. Kimball, 572 P.2d 376, 377 (Utah 
1977). However, a court should deny a motion to continue if 
the motion opposing summary judgment is dilatory or without 
merit. See id. 
1. Horman*s counsel refused to allow S. M. Horman, an 80 
year-old man who already had been subjected to extensive 
cross-examination during the initial deposition, to undergo yet 
further deposing until the trial court had ruled on its summary 
judgment motion. 
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Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
that a party opposing summary judgment may submit an affidavit 
stating the reasons why he is presently unable to present 
evidentiary affidavits essential to support his opposition to 
summary judgment• If the court finds the reasons to be 
adequate, the court may, among other things, order that further 
discovery be conducted and continue the summary judgment 
motion. The Utah Supreme Court, in Cox v. Winters, 678 P.2d 
311, 313-14 (Utah 1984), delineated several factors to consider 
\ under Rule 56(f) : 
1. Were the reasons articulated in the 
Rule 56(f) affidavit "adequate" or is the 
party against whom summary judgment is 
sought merely on a "fishing expedition" 
for purely speculative facts after 
substantial discovery has been conducted 
without producing any significant evidence? 
2. Was there sufficient time since the 
inception of the lawsuit for the party 
against whom summary judgment is sought to 
use discovery procedures, and thereby 
cross-examine the moving party? 
3. If discovery procedures were timely 
initiated, was the non-moving party 
afforded an appropriate response? 
Applying the foregoing legal principles, we find that the 
district court properly denied DACfs motion to compel further 
deposing of S. H. Horman and its motion to continue the summary 
judgment hearing. Both parties conducted extensive discovery. 
Hundreds of documents were produced. Lengthy depositions were 
taken. The record reveals that DAC failed to conduct further 
discovery although it had ample time and opportunity to do so. 
Discovery essentially ended on April 26, 1984. Three months 
elapsed before Horman filed its motion for summary judgment. 
During this three-month period DAC conducted no further 
discovery. DAC was given six weeks before oral argument on the 
motion for summary judgment in which to conduct any necessary 
discovery. Again, DAC sought no further discovery. DAC was 
also granted an additional 60-day extension specifically to 
respond to Horman's motion when DACfs original counsel withdrew 
five days before oral argument was scheduled. These additional 
60 days lapsed without DAC entering an appearance or seeking 
any additional discovery. 
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On November 2, 1984, nearly four months after Horman,filed 
its initial motion for summary judgment, and with no action by 
DAC to respond to the motion, Horman again noticed its motion 
for summary judgment and scheduled oral argument for November 
16, 1984 providing DAC yet another two weeks to respond to its 
motion. Three days prior to the scheduled oral argument, DAC's 
new counsel appeared and finally sought additional discovery by 
noticing nine depositions (scheduled after oral argument on the 
motion for summary judgment). 
On December 6, 1984, DAC moved to compel the* appearance of 
S. M. Horman to continue his deposition. DAC's motion to 
compel discovery was accompanied by an affidavit by its counsel 
claiming the need for further discovery.2 This affidavit, 
however, is deficient as a Rule 56(f) affidavit. It fails to 
articulate any material area of inquiry not covered by the 
original deposition of S. M. Horman. Rather, DAC's counsel 
merely states: 
Having read the Horman deposition there are a 
number of areas into which Mr. Zoll [DAC's 
original counsel] did not inquire and 
disposition of this case in a prompt and 
reasonable manner depends upon prompt access 
to the information and alleged testimony 
which will be given by Mr. Horman. 
There are a number of issues into which the 
Plaintiff's counsel Mr. Zoll did not inquire 
and notice was given at the end of the day 
that the deposition was being continued. 
We believe that DAC's counsel was simply on a "fishing 
expedition" for purely speculative facts after substantial 
discovery had been conducted without producing any significant 
evidence- Cox v. Winters, 678 P.2d at 312-313, 314. Moreover, 
DAC had sufficient time and opportunity before the summary 
judgment motion was argued to conduct discovery and in fact did 
so. 
We also are of the opinion that DAC had ample 
opportunity to cross-examine S. M. Horman during his initial 
deposition. The deposition took an entire day. At the initial 
2. DAC did not identify its affidavit as a Rule 56(f) 
affidavit. However, the substance of the affidavit suggests it 
was intended to be such. We are controlled by substance, not 
captions. Armstrong Rubber Co. v. Bastian, 657 P.2d 1346, 1348 
(Utah 1983). Therefore, we will treat DAC's affidavit as a Rule 
56(f) affidavit. 
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deposition DAC's original counsel requested that S. M. Horman 
and his counsel be available for two full days. Schedules were 
rearranged to meet this request. The deposition was stopped 
abruptly at 4:45 p.m. on the first day. Horman was prepared to 
proceed further that day and the next as scheduled by DACfs 
counsel. DACfs counsel/ however, chose not to proceed. 
By way of summary, the record indicates that DAC had 
over a year to conduct discovery and had been given several 
continuances and extensions by the trial judge. DAC did not 
articulate any specific factual area which needed further 
probing. Under the totality of the circumstances, the trial 
court reasonably concluded that no further factual development 
was necessary and properly denied DAC's motion to compel and 
its compel to continue. 
II. 
Next, we must determine if the trial court correctly 
found that the alleged oral modification of the Construction & 
Lease Agreement did not preclude Horman1s motion for summary 
j udgment. 
DAC contends that the parties orally modified the 
written contract, a contention which Horman disputes, by 
including an assignment by Horman of part of its leasehold 
interest in the Harver Warehouse Building to DAC. Both parties 
agree that Horman contemplated assigning its interest in the 
masterlease only if Horman was completely released by the 
owners of the Harver Warehouse Building from all obligations 
under the lease. The alleged oral modification also contained 
two other conditions precedent which were identical to those 
identified in the Construction & Lease Agreement. First, DAC 
was required to secure "adequate" construction and long-term 
financing, and second, DAC was to provide acceptable 
engineering reports to Salt Lake City to obtain the appropriate 
building permit to reinforce and reconstruct the Harver 
Warehouse Building. 
DAC concedes that when the statute of frauds requires a 
contract to be in writing, Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3 (1984), any 
alteration or modification must also be in writing. Zion* s 
Properties, Inc. v. Holt, 538 P.2d 1319, 1322 (Utah 1975). 
DAC, however, argues that the oral modification of the 
Construction & Lease Agreement was removed from the bar of the 
statute of frauds under the doctrine of partial performance. 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-8 (1984). 
DAC alleges that it partly performed the oral 
modification by attempting to secure the specified construction 
and long-term financing, by selling memberships to the clubs, 
and by retaining firms to perform the engineering studies. All 
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of the acts alleged, including the engineering studies and the 
financing, were not exclusively referable to the oral 
modification but were also required under the original 
Construction & Lease Agreement and thus would not remove the 
oral modification from the statute of frauds. See McDonald v. 
Barton Bros. Inv. Corp.. 631 P.2d 851, 853 (Utah 1981). More 
importantly, however, even if the oral modification was 
enforceable, DACfs position still fails. As more fully 
developed in section III of this opinion, the conditions 
precedent to the oral modification were not satisfied and thus 
Herman1s obligation to perform under the oral modification 
never arose. 
III. 
The third issue on appeal is whether the trial court 
erred in concluding as a matter of law that none of the 
conditions precedent to the written contract were satisfied 
thus excusing Horman's obligation to perform. 
It is undisputed that all the conditions precedent to 
the Construction & Lease Agreement had to be satisfied before 
Horman became obligated to construct and ultimately lease the 
athletic clubs to DAC. If one condition was not satisfied, 
Horman was excused from performing.3 A review of the record 
discloses that DAC failed to satisfy several of the conditions 
precedent to the written agreement. 
As previously discussed, Horman was to make improvements 
provided that the Harver Warehouse Building could be reinforced 
at a price that was acceptable to both parties, and in a manner 
that would satisfy the requirements of the Salt Lake City 
Building Department. This provision really contains two 
conditions precedent involving engineering studies. 
Engineering studies had to be completed before bhe cost of 
reinforcement could be determined and before the Building 
Department could consider whether to issue the appropriate 
permit. 
The undisputed facts in the record indicate that 
although DAC attempted to have engineering studies performed on 
the Harver Warehouse Building, no final engineering study was 
3. The Construction & Lease Agreement did not contain an 
express Mtime is of the essence* provision. Therefore, DAC had 
a reasonable time under the circumstances in which to satisfy 
the conditions precedent. Bradford v. Alvey & Sons, 621 P.2d 
1240, 1242 (Utah 1980). The agreement was executed on May 8, 
1981. DAC filed its complaint on September 9, 1983. 
Therefore, DAC had over two years to satisfy the conditions. 
Neither party questioned whether this was a sufficient amount 
of time for DAC to perform. 
860109-CA 8 
Affirmed. Costs to Horman. 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
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in fact completed much less submitted to the City for 
approval. 
DAC originally retained Bonneville Engineering to 
conduct the engineering studies. DAC later retained Scott 
Evans, managing partner of Cornwall Evans & Fife, architects. 
Evans in turn hired Ronald Weber of Weber & Associates to 
conduct the requisite engineering studies and determine costs. 
Scott Evans, in a sworn affidavit, claims that he hired a 
structural engineer to Hsuggest appropriate engineering 
upgrades or structural reinforcements'* as required by the 
City. Scott Evans, however, merely states that the Hresults" 
of the engineering study and recommendations for structural 
reinforcement and preliminary drawings were presented to Roger 
Evans, assistant director of the Department of Building & 
Housing Services for Salt Lake City Corporation. Scott Evans 
admits that Roger Evans, in a meeting, required final working 
drawings of the suggested engineering solutions. Conspicuously 
absent from Scott Evans' affidavit is his sworn statement that 
he did in fact submit the final engineering drawings and 
seismic analysis to the City and that they were approved. 
Roger Evans, the assistant director of the Department of 
Building & Housing Services for Salt Lake City Corporation, in 
his affidavit, states that DAC never submitted any plans, 
specifications, engineering reports or the requested seismic 
analysis to the Department. In light of Roger Evans' and Scott 
Evans' affidavits, it is uncontroverted that the requisite 
engineering studies were never submitted to the City. 
Consequently, the cost of reinforcement of the Harver Warehouse 
Building could not be determined and the City could not approve 
such reinforcement. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's 
conclusion that this condition precedent was not satisfied and 
Horman's obligation to perform under either the original 
Construction & Lease Agreement or the alleged oral modification 
was excused. 
Having found that this one condition precedent has not 
been performed, we decline to address whether DAC satisfied any 
other conditions because, as previously discussed, aJJL the 
conditions precedent had to be satisfied before Horman's 
performance was required. 
860109-CA 9 
3.58 
Lorin N. Pace #2498 
PACE & PARSONS 
350 South 400 East, Suite 101 
Salt lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 364-1300 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
DOWNTOWN ATHLETIC CLUB, a 
Utah Corporation 
Plaintiff & Appellant, 
vs. 
S.M. HORMAN, an Individual aka 
Sid Horman; S.M. Horman & Sons, 
a Partnership; & S.M. Horman 
& Sons Co. 
Defendants & Respondents. 
S.M. HORMAN & SONS CO. 
Counter-Plaintiff & 
Respondent, 
vs. 
DOWNTOWN ATHLETIC CLUB, a 
Utah Corporation, & DAVID 
YURTH, an Individual 
Counter-Defendants & 
Appellant. 
ORDER EXTENDING TIME FOR 
FILING WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
SUPREME COURT NO. 
Court of Appeals No. 86-0109-CA 
Based upon the motion of the appellant here attached 
together with the Affidavit of Counsel and good cause therefore 
appearing, it is hereby ordered: 
That the time within which a petition for a Writ of 
Certiorari may be filed is expanded to and including 10 days from 
the date of this order to and including the &ttr day of October, 
DATED this -adth-day of ^ Seplembe* , 1987. 
By the C0urt: 
'4^t< 
Honorable Jud^e 
DATED this 29th day of September, 1987. 
^VIVwO ) ^-? :riT<^ ^k 
x" 
Lorin N. Pace 
CERTIFICATE OF KAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY chat I Miiuu <. true ana correct copy of 
the foregoing Notice o'. Hearing Motion postage prepaid this 29th 
day of September, 1937 to: L. Ray Gardiner, Jr., 50 South main, 
SLC, Ut. 84101. / - N / ^ -_ O 
Secretary 
